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A STUDY OF TOTAL SPACE LIFE PERFORMANCE 
OF GSFC SPACECRAFT 
A. R. Timmins
Goddard Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
The space performance of an unmanned spacecraft has many aspects which are of differ-
ing importance to different user groups. For instance, the communications user groups 
are interested in long life and reliable operations. On the other hand, an experimenter 
may be interested in a few days of operation but at a precise time. Other experiments may 
need to be exposed to a range of space environments to verify readiness for an operational 
type of application. 
The space experience of a single spacecraft is useful to any user group in assessing the 
value of the test program associated with the spacecraft. The space experience of many 
spacecraft, however, is of greater value, and to a larger group that includes top manage-
evaluation 
personnel, and reliability assurance functions. To fulfill this need for grouped space ex-
perience, the performance of 57 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) spacecraft has been 
used. The present study emphasizes the total space life performance of the spacecraft. 
However, the study complements two previous studies (references 1 and 2) which docu-
mented the first-day and the first-month space performance of the same 57 spacecraft. 
The data base has been maintained constant where possible to facilitate the use of all three 
reports for a given need or purpose. However, the data in this report should be used if any 
differences are observed between this report and the two previous reports. For instance, 
additional documented first-day malfunctions which were received subsequent to the pub-
lication of reference 1 have been included in this report. 
DATA BASE 
The data for this study are taken from the performance of 57-unmanned spacecraft devel-
oped under the management of GSFC. The spacecraft include: 
•	 Four meteorological spacecraft 
•	 Two astronomical observatories 
•	 Six geophysical observatories 
•	 Six solar observatories
•	 Six applications technology spacecraft 
•	 Seven interplanetary monitoring platforms 
• Twelve operational weather spacecraft 
•	 Fourteen miscellaneous scientific missions 
The experiments and subsystems for these spacecraft have been provided by various organ-
izations, including GSFC, other government agencies, universities, and aerospace companies. 
Eighteen of the spacecraft received a full system test at GSFC, and the remaining 39 received 
a full system test in a contractor's facility. 
Throughout the report, the terms failure and malfunction will be encountered, and an under-
standing of the difference between them is necessary. The following definitions will be 
applicable: 
•	 A malfunction is any performance outside the specified limits and can be either 
a failure or a problem. 
•	 A failure is the loss of operation of any function, part, component, or subsystem, 
whether or not redundancy permitted a recovery of operation. 
•	 A problem is any substandard performance or partial loss of function which is not 
sufficient to be classed as a failure. 
TIME DISTRIBUTION OF SPACE MALFUNCTIONS 
Figure 1 shows the time distribution (in 30-day increments) of the malfunctions and failures 
documented for the 57 GSFC spacecraft. Figure 2 presents the space malfunctions (and, 
separately, the space failures) in a cumulative fashion for the first 3 years in space. Figure 3 
shows the number of spacecraft that were still alive for each of the 30-day time increments 
up to 1080 days. This figure also shows that the unnormalized data of figures .1 and 2 must 
be regarded as minimum values; for instance, after one year, the number of spacecraft con-
tributing to the data base has been reduced from 57 to 43. Figure 4 is another cumulative 
presentation showing the percent of total space failures for each 30 days of space life up to 
1080 days. 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF SPACE MALFUNCTIONS 
A classification, by type of device, of the space malfunctions from the 57 spacecraft is 
given in table 1. The percentage of malfunctions ascribed to electrical-type devices consti-
tutes over 50 percent of the total malfunctions for each of the three time periods (first day, 
first month, and total space life). 
Another classification, by spacecraft function, of the malfunctions from the 57 spacecraft 
is given in table 2. The experiments comprise approximately 50 percent of the malfunctions 
for each of the three time periods shown. The command and data handling function is the
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Figure 2. Relationship of space malfunctions and time.
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Figure 3. Distribution of space lives of 57 GSFC spacecraft. 
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Table 1 
Classification of Space Malfunctions from 57 Spacecraft by Type of Device 
Type of Device
Percent Space Malfunctions 
First Day First Month Total Space 
Electrical 57 59 57 
Electromechanical 17 21 12 
Mechanical 16 12 16 
Miscellaneous 10 8 1 5 
100 100 100 
Classification of Space Malfunctions from 57 Spacecraft by Spacecraft Function 
Spacecraft Function
Percent Space Malfunctions 
First Day First Month Total Space 
Experiment 48 47 50 
Command and Data 
Handling 16 20 25 
Stabilization and 
Control 10 14 13 
Power 9 9 8 
Other 17 10 4 
100 100 100
next largest contributor to the space malfunctions, and its percentage contribution increases 
for each of the three time periods. 
LIMITATIONS ON DATA 
The data base for this report is considered to be comprehensive and representative. Never-
theless, some limitations need to be kept in mind when assessing or using the results. The 
data are necessarily based on reported malfunctions. Some differences between reported 
and actual malfunctions can be expected, based on the wide spectrum of individuals respon-
sible for reporting a malfunction. Although there is no way to quantify the difference, it is 
thought to be small. For instance, the number of documented first-day space malfunctions 
for the spacecraft of this study has increased about 1 5 percent since reference 1 was pub-
lished in 1971. This situation emphasizes the fact that the malfunction data should be con-
sidered a minimum. 
The problem of radio frequency interference, including spurious commands, has been pur-
posely omitted from this study. This specialized problem has varied widely between satellites, 
orbits, location and power of ground-based energy sources, and command systems. The 
omission is indicative of the importance rather than unimportance of this type of malfunction. 
For instance, an early spacecraft had 400 anomalous command states during the first year 
in space. Inclusion of such data would have obscured the findings of this study. Because 
of continuing problems in this field, radio frequency interference testing of spacecraft 
before launch is considered as important now, if not more so, than in the early days of the 
space program. 
Ground station problems are another category which has not been included in this study. 
In the main, these are temporary, equipment-related, personnel-related types of events. 
When a malfunction was definitely ascribed to a spacecraft, it was then included as part of 
this study. 
CRITICALITY OF MALFUNCTIONS 
The 449 malfunctions on the 57 spacecraft include items of differing importance or critical-
ity and also include critical malfunctions which were not serious because redundancy per-
mitted complete fulfillment of the desired function. Another aspect of criticality is that 
the effect of the malfunction on the mission can be completely different than the effect on 
the component. To aid in the discussion of criticality, two terms are defined: 
• Mission criticality—A measure of the effect of a malfunction on the achievement 
of the mission objectives. The loss is given as a percentage of the mission objec-
tives. 
•	 Component criticality—A measure of the effect of a malfunction on the operation 
of a component. The loss is given as a percentage of component operation.
Mission and component criticality can each be considered with and without redundancy. 
Figure 5 gives some perspective on the distribution of the malfunctions with respect to mis-
sion criticality. Seventy-three percent of the malfunctions are classified as minor loss to the 
mission, assuming no redundancy, and 27 percent are classified as substantial or greater loss. 
With actual redundancy, the malfunctions classified as minor loss to mission were 85 percent, 
and 1 5
 percent were classified as substantial or greater loss. Another aspect of the benefit 
gained from redundancy is that the benefit extended to each of the three significant classifi-
cations (catastrophic, major, and substantial). 
Figure 5 also shows the component criticality distribution of malfunctions. The distribu-
tion, which assumes no redundancy existed, shows that the majority (55 percent) of the 
malfunctions were significant. Further, about 35 percent of the malfunctions were cata-
strophic loss of components. The criticality distribution of malfunctions, which shows the 
effect of actual redundancy, indicates that redundancy has effectively reduced the percentage 
of significant malfunctions from 55 to 36 percent. Figure 5 further shows that the per-
centage of catastrophic failures of components has been reduced from 35 to 23 percent 
through the benefits of redundancy. 
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Figure 5. Criticality of total space. malfunctions of 57 GSFC spacecraft. 
OBSERVATIONS 
The time distributions of the space malfunctions from the spacecraft are given in 30-day 
increments in figures 1, 2, and 4. Figure 3 shows that all of the 57 spacecraft did not 
operate for the entire 3-year time period covered. These data indicate several important 
points, as follows: 
• The comparatively large number of malfunctions in the first 30 days in space 
shows that all of the infant mortality type of malfunctions were not eliminated 
prior to launch. To further assess the first 30-day performance, reference 2 is 
recommended. It contains both mission and component criticality data together 
with other analyses of the data. 
•	 If there is a constant failure rate region, it does not occur until 90 (or probably 
more) days in space. Therefore, the exponential relationship for describing re-
liability in space is not considered appropriate because it is based upon a constant 
failure rate. 
• There is no indication of a wear-out phase of spacecraft components over the 
3 years of space life covered by these data. This is reassuring from the standpoint 
of life expectancy in space. Although individual spacecraft have had remarkable 
lifetimes in space (for instance, useful data were obtained from one GSFC space-
craft for over 8 years), summarized data on many spacecraft have not been reported. 
The composite data from this study indicate that long life is achievable for most 
spacecraft. 
• The data from figures 1 and 2 must be regarded as minimum values because of the 
decreasing sample size with time. (This is in addition to the question of complete-
ness of reported malfunctions mentioned previously.) 
• A safe estimate of the ratio of problems to failures is one-to-one. The ratio can 
be used for gross estimates of malfunctions if only failure data are available for 
various time periods in total space life. For more meaningful assessments, these 
data must be coupled with the component and mission criticality data. 
• The data need to be normalized to make them more usable for estimating 
purposes. 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 are normalized data. Figure 6 gives the malfunctions (and, separately, 
the failures) per spacecraft in 30-day increments for the first 1 .5 years in space and in 60-day 
increments for the second 1 .5 years in space. The data are in more usable form than the raw 
data of figure 1 and furnish a basis for estimating space performance based on past exper-
ience. Figure 7 gives the same data but on a cumulative basis. Normalizing the data has not 
changed the characteristic shape of the raw data from figure 2 but again makes the data 
more usable. Using this figure, the best estimates of expected failures for a spacecraft for 
30 days and for 3 years in space would be 1.7 and 5, respectively. Similar estimates can be 
made for the number of malfunctions and for other time periods. Figure 8 (similar to 
figure 4 but using normalized data) shows the percent of the total space failures that can be 
expected in 30-day time increments for the 3 years covered by the data. As can be seen 
from the figure, the percentages for 30, 180, and 360 days are 34, 62, and 75 percent, 
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Figure B. Percent of normalized space failures versus time. 
respectively. A separate graph was not prepared for malfunctions (problems plus failures) 
because the results were almost identical to figure 8. 
RELEVANCE OF DATA TO THE PRE-SHUTTLE ERA 
With the decrease in available funds in the past few years and possible additional cuts in the 
future, the emphasis has been on cutting costs even if it resulted in entailing additional risk. 
Taking additional risk without data could be expected to lead to a catastrophy. The data 
from the present study will not permit precise quantification of risk, but they should be 
helpful in assessing the role of system-level testing of spacecraft and in estimating the 
effect of major changes in system test programs. 
The time distribution of normalized space malfunctions is shown in figure 6. It shows 
1.7 failures per spacecraft and 3.0 malfunctions per spacecraft for the first 30 days in space. 
Each of the 57 spacecraft had a system-level environmental test program prior to launch. 
What would the space performance have been if there had been no system-level tests? A 
useful answer can be gained by making the following assumption: All the system-level mal-
functions occurred in a 30-day period, and, if they had not been corrected, they would have 
occurred in the first 30 days in space. This assumption overstates the case, primarily be-
cause all the system-level failures were not environmentally induced and some would be 
detected with a thorough functional checkout. On the other hand, all of the actual space 
0-
0 
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malfunctions were deferred by one 30-day time increment as part of the assumption. Thus, 
some unknown number of actual 30-day space malfunctions may now be excluded. Overall, 
the assumption is considered to lead to an upper boundary on expected space failures. 
The assumption, therefore, provides a means for useful and relevant insight to the space 
performance to be expected if system-level environmental tests had been eliminated on the 
spacecraft of this study. Using this assumption, figure 9 was constructed; it shows 12 fail-
ures per spacecraft for the system tests. (Malfunctions per spacecraft, not shown in figure 
9, were 27.) This indicates that a sevenfold increase in failures (and ninefold increase for 
malfunctions) for the first 30 days in space would have resulted if system-level environmen-
tal tests had not been conducted on the spacecraft. In other words, there would have been 
about 1500 malfunctions, of which approximately 680 would have been classified as 
failures for the first 30 days in space. Table 3 summarizes these and other data. 
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Figure 9. Time distribution of system test plus space failures of 57 GSFC spacecraft. 
Another interesting question concerns the percentage of total space malfunctions that occur 
in the first 30 days in space. How much change in the percentage might be expected if no 
system-level environmental test program were conducted? Figure 8 shows that 34 percent 
of the total space malfunctions from the 57 spacecraft occurred in the first 30 days. 
Table 3 shows that 75 percent of the total space malfunctions may occur in the first 30 days 
if system-level environmental tests arecompletely eliminated. Table 3 also shows that
11 
Table 3
Potential Effect of No System-Level Tests on Space Performance of 57 GSFC Spacecraft 
Item Affected	 -
Per Spacecraft Total Number 
 Failures Malfunctions Failures Malfunctions 
Actual Normalized Data for 
57 Spacecraft 
System Tests* 12 26.8 684 1528 
Thirty Days in Space 1.7 3.0 97 171 
Total Space Life 5.0 9.0 285 513 
Percent in First 30 Space Days 34 33 34 33 
Projected Space Performance Without 
System-Level Testst 
Thirty Days in Space 12 26.8 684 1528 
Total Space Life 17 35.8 969 2041 
Percent in First 30 Spacô Days 70 75 70 75
System test data, available on 39 spacecraft, was normalized to 57 spacecraft. 
See text for assumption. 
75 percent of the total space malfunctions amounts to over 1500 malfunctions for the 
57 spacecraft. This would have a significant effect on mission success if the best estimates 
of criticality of first-month space malfunctions from reference 2 are used. Those estimates 
for mission criticality, after making allowance for the benefit of redundancy, are 2 percent 
for catastrophic losses and 14 percent for all significant losses. By combining these values 
of criticality with the 1 528 malfunctions (see table 3) from the 30 days of system tests, an 
estimate of mission-critical losses can be made. An estimate of the number of catastrophic 
losses would be about 30,. and for all significant mission malfunctions, about 229. Clearly, 
such space performance would be unacceptable. Even if the assumption of the number of 
system-level malfunctions was decreased by 50 percent, the space performance would still 
be unacceptable. A goal in the pre-Shuttle era should be to demonstrate that the hardware 
quality has, or can be, improved, compared to that represented by this study. These results 
lead to two important points with respect to the pre-Shuttle era: 
•	 A study is necessary to show if the system test and space performance have changed 
since 1970 (present study covered 1960 to 1970). 
•	 Until results are available to discount the data of the present study, the GSFC 
philosophy of requiring system-level tests of flight spacecraft is not only justified, 
but necessary to maintain a satisfactory space performance. 
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RELEVANCE OF DATA TO THE SHUTTLE ERA 
Extensive studies have been conducted on the Shuttle concept and on the low cost payload 
aspect of it. Some generalized aspects envision standardized, modularized hardware, which 
in itself would result in large cost savings, and a reduction or possible elimination of the need 
for system-level environmental tests could result in additional savings. The inference of the 
present study is that these tenets should be demonstrated before the Shuttle era. 
With no change in hardware quality or test requirements, the results of this study indicate 
that, for the first 30 days in space, three malfunctions per spacecraft (with about half of 
these classified as failures) can be expected. Without system-level environmental tests (and 
with no change in hardware quality), the expectation would be 27 malfunctions per space-
craft, of which 12 would be failures for the first 30 days in space. 
To arrive at the desired cost-effective status envisioned by the cost studies of the Shuttle 
concept, the pre-Shuttle era should be used to demonstrate that hardware quality can be 
improved to the extent that system-level environmental tests no longer detect the large 
number of defects documented in this study. Until such a demonstration has been accom-
plished, no change is recommended in the GSFC policy of requiring a system-level environ-
mental test for flight spacecraft. 
CQNCLUS110NS 
The results of this study, in addition to the corollary studies of references 1 and 2, form 
the basis for the following conclusions on the space performance of GSFC spacecraft for 
the era of 1960 through 1970. 
•	 The GSFC philosophy of requiring a system-level environmental test of 
flight spacecraft has been effective and has played a significant part in achieving 
a successful space record. 
•	 Although the test practice at GSFC has been instrumental in achieving an out-
standing space performance record, it has not been so conservative as to eliminate 
all space malfunctions. 
•	 The time distribution of space malfunctions (and/or failures) shows that the 
infant mortality defects have not been completely eliminated by the test programs. 
•	 The failures per spacecraft for system environmental tests, first day in space, first 
month in space, and total space life were 12, 0.9, 1.7, and 5.0, respectively. 
•	 With present test philosophy and practice, about 35 percent of the total space 
malfunctions can be expected in the first 30 days in space, and about 50 percent 
of these will occur on the first day in space. 
•	 If there had been no system test program conducted, the following estimated 
figures (based on the 57 spacecraft of this study) are considered applicable:
13
a. The total space malfunctions would have quadrupled (2000 versus 500). 
b. Approximately 75 percent (or more than 1500) of the total space malfunc-
tions would have occurred in the first month in space. 
• With present test practice, the mission-critical malfunctions (which would cause 
loss of 50 to 100 percent of mission objectives) were about 9 percent of total 
malfunctions if there had been no redundancy and about 4 percent with redun-
dancy. 
• Component malfunctions which would cause loss of 50 to 100 percent of 
component objectives were about 43 percent of the total malfunctions if there 
had been no redundancy and about 28 percent with redundancy. 
• No change in GSFC test philosophy or practice is recommended until test and 
space performance show that additional risk is cost effective. 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Greenbelt, Maryland.
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